Existing approaches for protecting sensitive information outsourced at external "honest-but-curious" servers are typically based on an overlying layer of encryption applied to the whole database, or on the combined use of fragmentation and encryption. In this paper, we put forward a novel paradigm for preserving privacy in data outsourcing, which departs from encryption. The basic idea is to involve the owner in storing a limited portion of the data, while storing the remaining information in the clear at the external server. We analyze the problem of computing a fragmentation that minimizes the owner's workload, which is represented using different metrics and corresponding weight functions, and prove that this minimization problem is NPhard. We then introduce the definition of locally minimal fragmentation that is used to efficiently compute a fragmentation via a heuristic algorithm. The algorithm translates the problem of finding a locally minimal fragmentation in terms of a hypergraph 2-coloring problem. Finally, we illustrate the execution of queries on fragments and provide experimental results comparing the fragmentations returned by our heuristics with respect to optimal fragmentations. The experiments show that the heuristics guarantees a low computation cost and is able to compute a fragmentation close to optimum.
Introduction
Data outsourcing is today a well known paradigm that allows individuals and small/medium organizations to outsource their data to external servers and to delegate to them the responsibility of data storage and management. External servers, while typically relied upon for ensuring availability of data, might be trusted neither to access the content nor to fully enforce privacy protection requirements (honest-but-curious servers).
In the last few years, the problem of outsourcing possibly sensitive data to an external honest-but-curious server has raised considerable attention and various research activities have been carried out, providing the foundation for a large future deployment of the proposed solutions. A common practice that guarantees the protection of outsourced data also from the server's eyes consists in encrypting the data before outsourcing them [16, 21] . Recent proposals are, instead, based on the observation that often what is sensitive is the association among data, and not the individual data themselves, and that therefore encrypting the whole data may be an overdue [1, 10, 12, 14] . In these proposals, the outsourced data are modeled as a relational table, which can be vertically partitioned, thus splitting sensitive associations among two or more servers instead of encrypting the involved attributes thus minimizing the use of encryption. In [1] , the authors present an approach where the original relation containing the sensitive information to be outsourced is split into two fragments stored at two non communicating servers, which must not be known to each other. This limitation on the number of fragments implies that it is not always possible to protect the confidentiality of information by simply splitting attributes between the two fragments and therefore encryption may need to be applied.
Furthermore, the query evaluation process requires the data owner to interact with both servers for joining (if needed) the two fragments and to decrypt the attributes possibly encrypted that need to be accessed by the query. In [10, 12, 14] , the authors remove the limit on the number of fragments and present an approach where the relation to be outsourced can be split into two or more unlinkable fragments, which can even be stored all at the same server. Encryption is only used for protecting individual attributes whose release is not permitted.
Furthermore, for query execution efficiency, attributes that are not represented in the clear within a fragment are represented in encrypted form, providing the nice property that each fragment completely represents the original relation. The consequence of this design choice is that to evaluate a query, it is sufficient to access a single fragment, thus avoiding join operations, which are quite expensive. This solution still requires the owner to possibly decrypt the attributes appearing in encrypted form in the fragment for evaluating a condition on them or for returning them to the user.
A common assumption of all the solutions above is that encryption is an unavoidable price to be paid to protect the information. However, although cryptographic tools enjoy today, in most computing platforms, a limited cost and an affordable computational complexity, encryption still carries the burden of managing keys, which is a complex and expensive task. For instance, if the client is a lightweight device, with limited computation and storage resources, encryption and key management can be considered too expensive. In addition, even for scenarios where the cost of encryption/decryption operations and key management are considered acceptable, the execution of queries on encrypted data greatly increases the computational effort required to the DBMS, considerably impacting its applicability for real-world applications.
In this paper, we propose a paradigm shift for solving the problem of protecting outsourced data, which completely departs from encryption, thus freeing the owner from the burden of its management. In exchange, we assume that the owner, while outsourcing the major portion of the data at one or more external servers, is willing to locally store a limited amount of data. Obviously, from the information stored on the external server it should not be possible to reconstruct a sensitive association (confidentiality constraint) since otherwise privacy would be violated. Since we do not want to remove the assumption that the external servers are all honest-but-curious, the owner is the only entity in the system that can manage sensitive data. Like recent solutions, we therefore exploit data fragmentation to break sensitive associations; but, in contrast to them, we assume the use of fragmentation only. Basically, the owner maintains a small portion of the data, just enough to protect sensitive values or their associations. In [11, 13] , we presented an early version of our proposal that here is extended by introducing a different modeling (based on a hypergraph coloring problem) of the problem and an original heuristics for the computation of a fragmentation that minimizes the workload of the owner. In addition, we formally analyze the correctness and computational complexity of our heuristics. We also present a set of experiments, aimed at comparing our heuristics with the exhaustive search of the optimum, to assess its efficiency, in terms of computational time, and its effectiveness, in terms of the quality of the computed fragmentation. The experimental results prove that the fragmentations computed by our heuristics well approximate the optimal solutions. We also provide a characterization of the existing paradigms for data outsourcing in the presence of confidentiality constraints.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some basic concepts. Section 3 illustrates the rationale of our approach, also discussing it with respect to the previous proposals. Section 4 introduces the problem of computing a minimal fragmentation. Section 5 discusses different metrics with respect to which the workload of the owner could be minimized. Section 6 proves the NP-hardness of the minimal fragmentation problem and proposes a definition of local minimality which is used in the computation of a fragmentation. Section 7 reformulates the minimization problem as a hypergraph 2-coloring problem and presents a heuristic algorithm for its solution. Section 8 describes how queries can be executed on fragmented data. Section 9 illustrates the experimental results comparing our heuristic algorithm to an exhaustive approach. Section 10 discusses related work. Finally, Section 11 draws our conclusions.
Basic concepts
We consider a scenario where, consistently with other proposals (e.g., [1, 10, 15] ), the data to be protected are represented with a single relation r over a relation schema R(a 1 , . . . , a n ). We use the standard notations of the relational database model. Also, when clear from the context, we use R to denote either the relation schema R or the set of attributes in R.
Protection requirements are represented by confidentiality constraints, which express restrictions on the separate or joint visibility (association) of attributes in R, and are formally defined as follows [1, 10] . Let R(a 1 , . . . , a n ) be a relation schema, a confidentiality constraint c over R is a subset of attributes in R, that is, c ⊆ R.
Definition 2.1 (Confidentiality constraint)
While simple, confidentiality constraints of this form allow the representation of different protection requirements that may need to be expressed. A singleton constraint states that the values assumed by an attribute are considered sensitive and therefore cannot be made known to an external party. A non-singleton constraint (association constraint) states that the association among values of given attributes is sensitive and therefore cannot be made known to an external party. Figure 1( The satisfaction of a constraint c i clearly implies the satisfaction of any constraint c j such that c i ⊆c j . We assume set C f = {c 1 , . . . , c m } to be well defined , that is, C f does not contain a constraint that is a subset of
For instance, since Name is a sensitive attribute, no constraint needs to be applied in Example 2.2 with respect to the association between Name and sensitive attributes (i.e., Illness and Treatment).
To satisfy confidentiality constraints, we consider an approach based on data fragmentation. Fragmenting R means splitting its attributes into different vertical fragments (i.e., different subsets of attributes) in such a way that only attributes in the same fragment are visible in association [1, 10] . For instance, splitting Job and Illness into two different fragments offers visibility of the two lists of values, but not of their association. A fragment is said to violate a constraint if it contains all the attributes in the constraint. For instance, a fragment containing both Job and Illness violates constraint c 4 .
Classification of solutions and rationale of our approach
Existing approaches for enforcing confidentiality constraints on data to be outsourced typically assume the joint application of fragmentation and encryption, and may consider additional assumptions such as the impossibility of external servers to communicate with each other. In this paper, we put forward a novel approach departing from data encryption and from the assumption that external servers do not communicate with each other. The rationale for departing from encryption is that encryption is sometimes considered a too rigid tool, delicate in its configuration, and requiring careful management to fulfill its potential. Systems protecting sensitive information based on an extensive use of encryption suffer consequences due to possible compromises of keys (disclosure of data) or their loss (denial of service). In the real world, key management, particularly the operations at the human side, is a difficult and delicate process, and this causes a preference of many ICT administrators towards designs that avoid to excessively rely on encryption. Also, while the computational cost of symmetric encryption for modern computer architectures is usually negligible, the presence of encryption often causes an increase in the computational load. This increase is due to the limitations in the access to the data, which do not allow the server to efficiently and effectively evaluate generic predicates on the data. Our solution involves the data owner in storing (and managing) a small portion of the data, while delegating the management of all other data to external servers. We consider the management of a small portion of the data to be an advantage with respect to the encryption management and computation that would otherwise be required. Figure 2 presents the basic idea of our paradigm in contrast to the two previous main lines of work [1, 10] . In the figure, E i represents the set of attributes that are encrypted and C i represents the set of attributes stored in the clear in fragment F i .
• Non-communicating pair of servers [1] . This approach distributes the data to two external servers. It resorts to encryption whenever it is not possible to distribute the attributes among the two servers satisfying all the confidentiality constraints. In particular, all sensitive attributes are encrypted; other attributes are encrypted if placing them in any of the two fragments would violate at least one constraint. The main shortcoming of this approach is that confidentiality relies, besides on encryption, on the assumption of complete absence of communication between the two external servers, and therefore on the trust in the fact that such a communication will never happen. Such an assumption appears difficult to enforce in real scenarios.
• Multiple fragments [10, 12, 14] . Like [1] , this approach stores all data at external servers. However, it allows data to be split among more than two fragments. Hence, associations can always be protected by placing the involved attributes in different fragments. For each fragment, all the attributes of the original relation R that do not appear in the clear in the fragment are stored in encrypted form. Protection against joining of fragments is guaranteed by the absence of common attributes in the different fragments. There is no restriction on the communication among external servers, since the complete visibility of all fragments cannot violate confidentiality constraints. As a matter of fact, all fragments could even be stored at a single server.
• No encryption [11, 13] . Completely departing from encryption, in this approach we assume that the owner maintains some of the data, so to avoid exposing sensitive attributes or associations externally. Sensitive attributes are maintained at the owner side. Sensitive associations are protected by ensuring that not all attributes in an association are stored externally. In other words, for each sensitive association, the owner should locally store at least one of the involved attributes. With this fragmentation, the original relation R is split into two fragments, called F o and F s , stored at the data owner and at the server side, respectively. To guarantee the reconstruction of the content of the original relation R (lossless join property), at the physical level the two fragments F o and F s must have a common key attribute. We assume F o and F s to have a common tuple id (attribute tid as in Figure 3 ) that can be either: 1) the key attribute of the original relation, if it is not sensitive, or 2) an attribute that does not belong to the schema of the original relation R and that is added to F o and F s during the fragmentation process. We consider this a physical-level property and ignore the common attribute in the fragmentation process.
Minimal fragmentation
Given a set C f of confidentiality constraints over relation R, our goal is to split R into two fragments: F o , stored at the owner side, and F s , stored at the server side, in such a way that all sensitive data and associations are protected (i.e., they are not visible at the external server). It is easy to see that, since there is no encryption, singleton constraints can only be protected by storing the corresponding attributes at the owner side. Therefore, each singleton constraint c ={a } is enforced by inserting a into F o and by not allowing a to appear in F s . 
Given a relation schema R(a 1 , . . . , a n ) and a set C f of confidentiality constraints, our goal is to produce a correct fragmentation that minimizes the owner's workload. For instance, a fragmentation where F o =R and F s =∅ is clearly correct, but it is also undesirable (unless required by the confidentiality constraints), as it leaves to the owner the burden of storing all information and of managing all possible queries.
The owner's workload may be a difficult concept to capture, since different metrics might be applicable in different scenarios (see Section 5) . Regardless of the metrics adopted, we model the owner's workload as a
weight function w:P(R) × P(R)→R
+ that takes a pair ⟨F o ,F s ⟩ of fragments as input and returns the storage and/or the computational load at the owner side due to the management of F o . Assume the weight function w to be monotonic with respect to the set containment relationship on F o . Formally, given two fragmentations, Before proceeding on the investigation of the problem, we present some possible fragmentation metrics and the corresponding weight functions.
Fragmentation metrics
In the outsourcing scenario, storage and computational resources offered by the external server are considered less expensive than the resources of the data owner. The owner has then a natural incentive to rely as much as possible, for storage and computation, on the external server. In the absence of confidentiality constraints, all data would then be remotely stored and all queries would be computed by the external server. In the case of confidentiality constraints, the owner internally stores some attributes, and consequently is involved in some computation.
In this section, we discuss several metrics (and corresponding weight functions to be minimized) that could be used to characterize the owner's workload for a fragmentation, and therefore to determine which attributes are stored at the owner and which attributes are outsourced at the external server. The different metrics may be applicable to different scenarios, depending on the owner's preferences and/or on the specific knowledge (on the data or on the query workload) available at design time. We consider four possible scenarios, in increasing level of required knowledge. The first two scenarios measure storage, while the latter two scenarios measure computation. The scenarios and corresponding weight functions are summarized in Figure 4 .
• Min-Attr . Only the relation schema (set of attributes) and the confidentiality constraints are known.
The only applicable metric aims at minimizing the storage required at the owner side by minimizing the number of attributes in F o . The weight w a (F) of a fragmentation F is the number of attributes
{ZIP,Illness,HDate}⟩ illustrated in Figure 3 , w a (F)=5.
• Min-Size. Besides the mandatory knowledge of the relation schema and of the confidentiality constraints on it, the size of each attribute is known. In this case, it is possible to produce a more precise estimate of the storage required at the owner side, aiming at minimizing the physical size of F o , that is, the actual storage required by its attributes. The weight w s (F) of a fragmentation F is the physical size of the • Min-Query. In addition to the relation schema and the confidentiality constraints, a representative profile of the expected query workload is known. The profile defines, for each query, the expected frequency with which the query is executed and the set of attributes appearing in the conditions in the query. The query workload profile is modeled as a set of triples Knowledge on the workload allows the adoption of a metric evaluating the computational work required to the owner for executing queries. Intuitively, the goal is to minimize the number of query executions that require processing at the owner, producing immediate benefits in terms of reduced use of the more expensive, and less powerful, computational services available at the owner. The weight w q (F) of a fragmentation F is then the number of times that the owner needs to be involved in evaluating queries, that is, the sum of the frequencies of queries whose set of attributes in the where clause contains at
For instance, given fragmentation F=⟨{SSN,Name,DoB,Job,Treatment}, {ZIP,Illness,HDate}⟩ illustrated in Figure 3 and the query workload in Figure 5 
• Min-Cond . In addition to the relation schema and the confidentiality constraints, a complete profile of the expected query workload is known. The complete profile reports the specific conditions appearing in each query and not only the set of attributes appearing in the where clause of the query. We assume select-from-where SQL queries of the form q ="select A from R where C", where A is a subset of the attributes in R, and C= involving an attribute in F o . Note that conditions are considered separately, hence the evaluation of n different conditions co i ,. . . ,co n of a query q that involve some attributes in F o will contribute to the weight for n · freq(q ) (whereas in the Min-Query scenario the weight would be freq(q ), since Min-Query evaluates only whether the owner participates in a query evaluation regardless of the number of conditions it has to evaluate). Formally,
Note that the frequencies of queries q 1 , q 2 , and q 6 are considered twice in the computation of w c (F), since these queries include two conditions operating on attributes in F o .
Note that the minimization of the set of conditions executed at the owner side has a direct relationship with the minimization of the traffic needed for receiving results to the queries outsourced to the external server. As a matter of fact, minimizing the conditions executed by the owner is equivalent to maximizing the conditions outsourced to the external server, and therefore delegating to it as much computation as possible. Since the result of evaluating a condition on a relation is a smaller relation, the greater the number of conditions outsourced to the external servers, the smaller will be the corresponding results to be received in response. 
Problem analysis
We now analyze the complexity of the MF problem and of its instances, and then we characterize the solution space of the MF problem.
Complexity of the problems
The general MF problem as well as its instances Min-Attr, Min-Size, Min-Query, and Min-Cond are NP-hard, as formally stated by the following theorem. problem, where the size of each attribute is the number of times that conditions on it need to be evaluated.
Theorem 6.1 The MF problem and its instances
Such a specific instance of the Min-Cond problem is therefore NP-hard. Consequently, the general Min-Cond problem is NP-hard. 
Solution space
Since Figure 1 (a) over the set {DoB, ZIP, Job, Illness} of attributes.
In this case, the confidentiality constraints that need to be enforced are constraints c 2 and c 4 in Figure 1( Figure 6 , correct fragmentations are framed by solid boxes, while fragmentations that violate at least one constraint are framed by dotted boxes.
Since the number of fragmentations populating the solution space is exponential in the number of attributes composing R, and the minimal fragmentation problem is NP-hard (see Theorem 6.1), we propose a definition of local minimality, which can be used to find a correct fragmentation via an efficient heuristics (see Section 7.2).
Before defining a locally minimal fragmentation, it is interesting to note that the weight of the fragmentations decreases along each path from the top to the bottom element of the fragmentation lattice (i.e., given a fragmentation F and a fragmentation
). This property, proved by the following proposition, is a direct consequence of the fact that we assume the weight function to be monotonic with respect to the set containment of F o . In the following, we first model the LMF problem as a hypergraph coloring problem that captures, as special cases, all the weight functions defined in Section 5. We then illustrate a heuristic algorithm for its solution.
Graph modeling of the problem and heuristic algorithm
In this section, we present a modeling of the MF and of the LMF problems as a hypergraph 2-coloring problem.
We also introduce a heuristic algorithm that uses such a modeling.
Hypergraph coloring problem
Before illustrating how to compute a locally minimal fragmentation, we analyze the weight functions discussed in Section 5. We first observe that we can model the data and query workload as a set T of weighted subsets of R. We will refer to each subset of the attributes in the original relation R, which is characterized by a weight, as a weighted target t ∈T . Each metric evaluates the intersection between F o and the weighted targets in T describing the considered workload: the basic idea is that the workload of the owner raises with the increase of the number of weighted targets that have a non empty intersection with F o . For each weight function introduced in Section 5, the corresponding set of weighted targets is defined as follows.
• w a : each attribute a ∈R corresponds to a target t ={a } whose weight is 1.
• w s : each attribute a ∈R corresponds to a target t ={a } whose weight is the size of the attribute.
• w q : each set Attr (q i ) of attributes characterizing a query q i corresponds to a target t =Attr (q i ) whose weight is sum of the frequencies of all queries q i characterized by the same set Attr (q i ).
• w c : each set Attr (co ) of attributes representing the attributes on which a condition co operates corresponds to a target t =Attr (co ) whose weight is the frequency of condition co (i.e., the sum of the frequencies of the queries including a condition operating on Attr (co ) in the where clause).
In the following, function w T : T → R + determines the weight of each target t in T . The weight of a fragmentation F is then computed as the sum of the weights of the targets hit by F o , that is, having a non empty intersection with
As an example, consider fragmentation F=⟨{SSN,Name,DoB,Job,Treatment}, {ZIP,Illness,HDate}⟩ in Figure 3 and the workload profile in Figure 5 (b). We have that w q (F)=w T (Attr (q 1 )) + w T (Attr (q 2 )) + w T (Attr (q 3 )) + w T (Attr (q 4 )) + w T (Attr (q 6 )) + w T (Attr (q 7 )) + w T (Attr (q 8 )) = 4 + 14 + 1 + 1 + 4 + 3 + 6 = 33. Figure 7 summarizes the definition of the set T of targets and w T for the different weight functions considered.
The inputs to the LMF problem (as well as to the MF problem) can now be modeled as a hypergraph as follows. 
, where:
• A = R is the set of vertices of the hypergraph;
• C = C f is the set of non-weighted hyperedges (C-edges in the following) of the hypergraph;
• T is the set of weighted hyperedges (T -edges in the following) and corresponds to the set T of targets associated with w;
• w T is the weight function defined over T .
As an example, consider relation Patient, its confidentiality constraints in Figure 1 , and the data and workload profiles in Figure 5 . 
, weight(H,color)= ∑ t ∈T w T (t ) s.t. ∃v ∈ t , color(v)=Own).
A correct fragmentation F=⟨F o ,F s ⟩ for R can now be interpreted as a coloring function over the CThypergraph such that the Own-vertices are those representing attributes in F o and the Srv-vertices are those representing attributes in F s . Analogously, a coloring function color can be interpreted as a correct fragmentation if no C-edge in the hypergraph is incident to only Srv-vertices, as formally stated in the following.
Definition 7.2 (Correct coloring) Let H(A, C ∪ T , w T ) be a CT-hypergraph and color : A→{Own,Srv} be a corresponding 2-coloring function. Function color is a correct coloring for H with respect to C, iff ∀ e ∈ C:
∃v ∈ e such that color(v)=Own. 3. non-redundancy is guaranteed by the fact that function color assigns no more than one color to each vertex in A (i.e., no attribute belongs to both F o and F s ).
As an example, Figure 9 illustrates a colored CT-hypergraph for the Min-Att problem, where Own- Given the correspondence between the hypergraph coloring and a correct fragmentation, the definition of minimal fragmentation (Definition 4.2) can be reformulated as a minimal coloring of the CT-hypergraph as follows. 
Definition 7.3 (Minimal coloring) Let H(A, C ∪ T , w T ) be a CT-hypergraph and

Definition 7.4 (Locally minimal coloring) Let H(A, C ∪ T , w T ) be a CT-hypergraph and color :
A→{Own The LMF problem directly corresponds to the problem of computing a locally minimal coloring for H. The heuristic algorithm illustrated in Section 7.2 uses this correspondence to compute a fragmentation F that is locally minimal with respect to C and w, where w is a monotonic weight function associating a weight with each target t in T .
Heuristic algorithm
Our heuristic algorithm, illustrated in Figure 10 , takes as input the CT-hypergraph
modeling an instance of the locally minimal fragmentation problem and returns the set Own of Own-vertices in the hypergraph, which corresponds to the set of attributes composing F o .
Given a vertex v , let w (v ) be the sum of the weights of its incident T -edges, and let c(v ) be the number of
C-edges incident to v (which corresponds to the number of constraints that include the attribute represented by v ). The ratio w (v )/c(v ) reflects the relative cost of including vertex v into Own, obtained as the weight to
pay divided by number of constraints that would be solved by including the attribute represented by v into F o .
At initialization, the set of constraints and weighted targets are those given in input to the problem, and the set Own of Own-vertices is empty.
We first note that any correct fragmentation must include in F o all the attributes appearing in singleton constraints. Therefore, vertices representing attributes appearing in singleton constraints must be inserted into Own. Given this observation, the first for each loop of the algorithm identifies singleton C-edges (i.e., C-edges incident to one vertex only) and removes from the hypergraph the vertices to which these C-edges are incident. The removed vertices are inserted into Own. Moreover, the algorithm removes all the C-edges and T -edges incident to a vertex that has been removed (i.e., constraints and targets including attributes appearing in singleton constraints). In particular, the T -edges are removed since these targets are incident to at least an Own-vertex and therefore there is no further weight to consider for them. 
At each iteration of the while loop, a vertex with lowest w (v )/c(v ) ratio is inserted into Own and the C-edges
and figure) .
The execution of the algorithm produces the following results:
• We can observe that the dynamic computation of the ratios can be adequately managed with a priority of a vertex v is dynamically updated (due to the removal of some of its incident hyperedges), the vertex v is removed and inserted again in the queue with the new ratio value. Assuming implementation of the dynamic computation of the ratios through a priority queue, the proposed heuristic algorithm has a polynomial time complexity and correctly computes a locally minimal fragmentation, as proved by the following theorems. Figure 10 is O(n + (
Theorem 7.6 Given a CT-hypergraph H = (A, C ∪ T , w T ), the computational complexity of the algorithm in
where n = |A|.
Proof:
The construction of the priority queue costs O(n). The first for each loop and the while loop
, since: i) each attribute is visited at most once, ii) each hyperedge is considered only once for each attribute to which it is incident, and iii), in the worst case, each vertex is removed and inserted in the queue every time its incident hyperedges are updated. The deletion and the insertion in a priority queue can be performed in log(n) time. Also the extraction of the element with highest priority can be performed in log(n) time. The last for each loop verifies whether removing a vertex from Own, all the hyperedges in C include at least a vertex in Own. This control is performed for each vertex in Own, and again each hyperedge is considered at most once for each vertex to which it is incident. The cost of this step is Figure 10 ; the algorithm in Figure 10 terminates Proof: Let Own be the solution computed by the algorithm in Figure 10 and F=⟨F o , F s ⟩ be the corresponding fragmentation. To prove that F represents a locally minimal fragmentation, we need to prove that both the conditions in Definition 6.5 are satisfied.
1. To prove that F is correct we show that: The algorithm terminates since all the for each loops iterate on finite sets, that is, the set A of vertices, the set C of C-edges, the set T of T -edges, and the set Own of Own-vertices (which is a subset of A). Also, at each iteration of the while loop, a vertex is removed from the hypergraph. In the worst case, the while loop is iterated n times.
Query execution
Users formulate queries referring to the original relation schema R, without worrying about whether or not R has been fragmented. However, at the physical level, R is stored by means of the two fragments F o and F s resulting from the fragmentation process described in the previous sections. Therefore, queries submitted by authorized users and referring to R need to be translated into equivalent queries operating on F o and/or F s .
We consider select-from-where SQL queries of the same form as the queries populating the workload profiles (see Section 5) , that is, q ="select A from R where C", where A is a subset of the attributes in R, with  a i and a j attributes in R, {v,v 1 , . . . , v k } constant values in the domain of a i , and op a comparison operator in {=, >, <, ≥, ≤, ̸ =}. We now describe the query translation process.
Classification of conditions
Condition C = ∧ i co i in the where clause of a query can be split into three conditions, namely C o , C s , and C so , depending on the attributes involved in the subexpression and that determine the party (owner and/or external server) responsible for its evaluation.
is the conjunction of the conditions in C that can be evaluated only by the owner , independently from the server, since they involve only attributes stored at the owner.
• C s = ∧ i co i : Attr (co i ) ⊆ F s is the conjunction of the conditions in C that can be evaluated by the external server , independently from the owner, since they involve only attributes stored at the server.
Note that, since the attributes stored at the server can be safely communicated to the owner, C s could also be evaluated by the owner. However, this last option is highly impractical and should be avoided, because it requires to send to the owner the projection over F s of the attributes Attr (co i ), for each co i in C s . (a i op a j ) , where a i ∈F o and a j ∈F s or viceversa. Therefore, these conditions require to evaluate information at the server and at the owner, since they involve both attributes stored at the owner and attributes stored at the server. Note that the conditions in C so involve attributes of F o that cannot be released to the external server, since they would possibly violate confidentiality constraints. Therefore, C so can be evaluated only by the owner. Figure 3 
Example 8.1 Consider the fragmentation in
Query evaluation strategies
The evaluation process of a query q on R can follow two different strategies, depending on the order in which conditions C o , C s , and C so are evaluated. The Server-Owner strategy first evaluates C s at the server side and then evaluates both C o and C so at the owner side. The Owner-Server strategy first evaluates C o at the owner side, then evaluates C s at the server side, and finally checks C so at the owner side again. The left-hand side of Figure 13 illustrates the two algorithms implementing the Server-Owner and Owner-Server strategies, respectively, executed by the owner for translating and evaluating q . In the following, we briefly illustrate the working of the two algorithms.
• Server-Owner strategy. The basic idea is that first the server evaluates the conditions in C s on F s , and then the owner refines the result by filtering out the tuples that satisfy neither C o nor C so .
The owner receives from the user the query q (step 1) to be evaluated. For the evaluation of q , she splits the condition C in the where clause of q into three subexpressions, C o , C s , and C so , as illustrated in Section 8.1 (step 2), and identifies the set A q s of attributes that belong to F s , but that she needs for completing the evaluation of q (i.e., that belong to A or appear in a basic condition in C so ) (step 3). The owner then defines and sends to the server the query q s , operating on F s and evaluating condition C s (step 4). The select clause of this query is composed of A q s and attribute tid, which is necessary to join the result of q s with F o . The server evaluates q s and sends its result R s back to the owner (step 5). The owner defines and executes the query q so operating on the join between R s and F o and evaluating both C o and C so (step 6). The result of the evaluation of query q so corresponds to the result of the original query q and is then returned to the user (step 7).
• Owner-Server strategy. The basic idea is that first the owner evaluates the conditions in C o on F o , the server then refines the result by filtering out the tuples that do not satisfy C s , and finally the owner discards the tuples that do not satisfy C so . The first three steps performed by the owner are the same as for strategy Server-Owner. She then defines and executes query q o , operating on F o and evaluating condition C o (step 4). The select clause of this query is composed of attribute tid only, which is the only attribute that can be communicated to the server (step 5) and is needed to perform the join. The owner sends to the server the query q s , operating on the join between R o and F s and evaluating condition C s , for execution (step 6). The select clause of query q s (as for Server-Owner strategy) is composed of A q s and attribute tid. The server evaluates q s and returns its result R s to the owner (step 7), who defines and executes query q so operating on the join between R s and F o and evaluating C so (step 8). The relation resulting from the evaluation of query q so , corresponding to the result of the original query q , is returned to the user (step 9). Figure 1 The choice between the Server-Owner and Owner-Server strategies depends on the possible leakage of information that the Owner-Server strategy may cause. If the external server is supposed to know or can infer query q , the Owner-Server strategy cannot be adopted as it would cause leakage of information. In fact, the external server would learn that the tuples in R o are all and only the tuples that satisfy C o . As an example, consider query q = "select Illness from Patient where DoB>1985/12/31 and ZIP=22031" over relation Patient.
Example 8.2 Consider relation Patient in
If we adopt the Owner-Server strategy, q o = "select tid from F o where DoB>1985/12/31" returns only two tuples tuple with tid=3 and tid=4. The external server then evaluates query q s = "select tid, Illness from F s join R o on F s .tid=R o .tid where ZIP=22031", which returns only one tuple, with tid=4. Knowing q , the external server can, from the result, reconstruct the sensitive associations among DoB, ZIP, and Illness (violating c 2 ) for the tuple with tid=4. We also note that, also assuming that the server does not know q , it knows that the tuples in R o are all and only the tuples in R that satisfy a given condition. By observing a long enough series of queries, the server could possibly infer information about the content of R (and reconstruct sensitive associations).
2
If the server does not know and cannot infer q , both the Server-Owner and Owner-Server strategies can be adopted without privacy violations. In this case, the choice between the two strategies can only be based on performance. In other words, following the criterion usually adopted by distributed database systems, the most selective condition is evaluated first (i.e., the sub-query with the smallest result is anticipated). Therefore, if C o is more selective than C s , the Owner-Server strategy is adopted; if C s is more selective than C o , the Server-Owner strategy is adopted.
Experimental results
We have implemented our heuristic algorithm to assess its efficiency and effectiveness, in terms of both the quality of the returned solution and the execution time for its computation. MB cache, and a Linux Ubuntu 9.04 operating system (kernel 2.6.28-11-server).
The relation schema considered in the experiments is composed of 50 attributes. The experiments have considered configurations with an increasing number of attributes, from 5 to 50. For each configuration of n attributes, we randomly generated a well defined set of confidentiality constraints composed of a number of constraints varying from 2 to 0.85 · n, each including a number of attributes ranging between 1 and 0.5 · n.
Analogously, for each configuration of n attributes, we randomly generated a query workload characterized by a number of queries varying from 2 to n, each operating on a number of attributes ranging between 1 and 0.5 · n, and with frequency ranging between 1 and 10. The results illustrated in the following are computed as the average of the values obtained with 30 runs for each configuration of n attributes.
As for the execution time, the heuristic algorithm considerably outperforms the exhaustive search. For all the runs, execution times of the heuristic algorithm remained below the measurement threshold of 1 ms.
Consistent with the fact that the MF problem is NP-hard (see Theorem 6.1), the exhaustive algorithm requires exponential time in the number of attributes, and takes more than one day to compute a solution when the number of attributes reaches 37. As a consequence, we run the exhaustive algorithm only for configurations with 37 attributes at most and, based on the observed results, estimated the trend for larger numbers of attributes. Figure 14 reports the computational time of the heuristic algorithm, the computational time of the exhaustive algorithm for configurations with up to 37 attributes, and the estimated trend of the computational time of the exhaustive algorithm for configurations with more than 37 attributes.
In terms of the quality of the solution, the weight of the fragmentation computed by the heuristic algorithm is, for the values observed, always close to the optimum obtained with the exhaustive search. Figure 15 reports the weight of the solution computed by both our heuristic and the exhaustive search algorithm. On average, the error observed over all the configurations considered is 6.22%. However, the results highlight that, in many configurations, our heuristics computes a locally minimal fragmentation that is also a minimal fragmentation.
Related work
Work most closely related to our is in the area of data outsourcing [21, 23] . The works proposed in this scenario mainly differ from the proposal illustrated in this paper since they are based on the assumption that data are entirely encrypted to protect their privacy. As a consequence, such proposals focus mainly on the design of techniques allowing efficient query evaluation on encrypted data. In [21, 23] , the authors first propose a solution based on the definition of indexing information, stored together with the encrypted database, to be used by the DBMS to evaluate equality conditions on the encrypted data. The first support for range queries is illustrated in [16] and is based on the traditional index structure used by relational DBMSs to support range conditions, that is, B+ trees. In [16] the authors also propose a hash-based indexing technique for equality conditions. An indexing method that guarantees the efficient evaluation of both range and equality queries has been introduced in [27] . This solution uses B-trees and produces an almost flat distribution of the frequencies of index values, to limit the risk of inference exposure [8] . Different proposals (e.g., [2, 22, 28] ) have been studied for providing a better support of SQL clauses, minimizing the burden for the requesting client in the query evaluation process.
The first proposal suggesting the storage of plaintext data, while enforcing confidentiality constraints, is presented in [1] . The solution introduced in [1] breaks sensitive associations by storing on two remote servers the attributes that should not be publicly visible together. The servers are assumed to belong to two different service providers, which never exchange information. The sensitive associations that cannot be split between the two servers are protected by resorting to encryption. That is, one of the attributes belonging to the sensitive association is encrypted, the encrypted attribute is stored on one server, and the encryption key on the other.
The work presented in [10, 12, 14] proposes a solution that permits storing multiple fragments on a single server, thus removing the trust in the fact that the servers do not communicate. This proposal is based on the combined use of fragmentation and encryption and aims at leaving in plaintext all the attributes whose values are not considered sensitive per se (i.e., attributes that do not appear in singleton constraints). The fragmentation process is guided by a definition of minimality, aimed at reducing either the number of fragments [10] or the cost of query evaluation over fragmented data [12] .
The first solution completely departing from encryption for confidentiality constraint satisfaction is presented in [13] . This proposal is based on the assumption that the data owner is willing to store a limited portion of the information. As a consequence, privacy constraints are enforced by fragmenting the data such that sensitive associations are broken (or completely stored at the owner site). The query evaluation process to adopt in this scenario is described in [11] . The solution proposed in this paper extends the works in [11, 13] , since we propose a new modeling (and therefore a different algorithm) for the fragmentation problem, which is conveniently formulated as a hypergraph 2-coloring problem.
A different, but related, line of work is represented by the proposals in [4, 5, 6] , where the authors exploit functional dependencies to the aim of correctly enforcing access control policies. In [5] the authors propose a policy based classification of databases to guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive data. To this purpose, the solution proposed first determines a set of classification instances, representing the combinations of values that need to be protected. Classification instances are then used to determine if the result of the evaluation of a query contains a combinations of values that is considered sensitive and therefore access to the query result should not be permitted. In [4] the authors propose a method for the definition of privacy constraints, based on the reduction of the problem of protecting the data from inference to the problem of enforcing of access control in relational databases. In [6] the authors propose a model for the modification of the database instance visible to the user, guaranteeing both data confidentiality (as specified by the data owner's policy) and consistency with user's prior knowledge.
The problem of fragmenting relational databases while maximizing query efficiency has already been studied in the literature and some approaches have been proposed [25, 26] . However, these techniques are not applicable to our problem, since they are only aimed at performance optimization and do not take into consideration protection requirements. Also, the classical proposals introduced for the management of queries both in centralized and distributed systems [3, 7, 24 ] cannot be applied in our context since they do not take confidentiality constraints into consideration.
The work presented in this paper has some affinity with the work in [17] . Although this approach shares with our problem the common goal of enforcing confidentiality constraints on data, it is concerned with retrieving a data classification (according to a multilevel mandatory policy) that ensures sensitive information is not disclosed. Also, it does not consider the possibility of fragmenting data.
Conclusions
The paper presented a model and an efficient technique for enforcing confidentiality constraints defined on data that are outsourced to an external honest-but-curious server. Our approach departs from encryption and is based on the availability at the owner of local trusted storage, which can be efficiently used to store a limited set of data, just enough to guarantee privacy protection. We introduced the problem of computing a minimal fragmentation with respect to different metrics expressing the workload at the owner side, and provided a formulation of the problem in terms of a 2-coloring of a hypergraph. We also presented a heuristics that solves the hypergraph 2-coloring problem and experimentally proved that our heuristics returns a solution close to the optimum. Several open issues still remain to be addressed such as the development of sophisticated metrics for evaluating the workload of the owner that take into consideration the selectivity of queries and of alternative solutions for guaranteeing that the outsourced data do not reveal sensitive associations. Another interesting aspect that deserves investigation concerns dynamic scenarios, that is, when either the workload of the data owner or the confidentiality constraints may change. Incremental approaches can be devised to compute a new fragmentation starting from the existing one thus avoiding complete recomputation and improper exposure due to independent views (as simply producing a new independent solution could enable the server to merge attribute views at different times and breach confidentiality constraints). E 1 C 1 E 2 C 2 E n C n ...
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External Server Name, DoB (Name > 'F'), (DoB < 1980/01/01) q 2 14 Name, Job (Name < 'G'), (Job = 'employee') q 3 1 Name, Illness (Name > 'C'), (Illness = 'asthma') q 4 1 DoB, Illness (DoB ≥ 1960/01/01), (Illness = 'measles') q 5 15 ZIP, Illness (ZIP = 22030), (Illness = 'flu') q 6 4 Job, Illness (Job = 'nurse'), (Illness = 'latex allergy') q 7 3 DoB, Illness, Treatment (DoB < 1970/01/01), (Illness = 'hypertension'), (Treatment = 'diet') q 8 6 DoB, HDate, Treatment (HDate − DoB ≥ 18y), (Treatment = 'antihistamine') q 9 5 HDate (HDate ≥ 1990/01/01) (b) g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g 
